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Ethan Taylor
Dr. Nayak
4/18/12
Justifying Peacemaking Efforts in Afghanistan
Introduction and Thesis:
The situation in Afghanistan seems to be about as dire as it was in the 1980s. One major
difference, though, is that Soviet forces no longer occupy the country, and at least the United
States/NATO occupation is under the pretext of a humanitarian effort. Even so, the tragic
process of U.S.-led state-building that has unfolded these last ten years has yielded little in terms
of an effective government or infrastructure of any kind. If anything, the terrorist threat that the
U.S. hoped to quell has become more elusive and determined than ever. Ethnic rivalry and
warlordism are as prevalent as they were during the post-Soviet civil war of the mid-1990s, and
the “neutral” Western forces currently in the country are more commonly seen as aggressors
similar to the Taliban, external liberators who reneged on their promises to end gender-based
violence. In light of these manifest failures, the analysis will begin under the premise of doubt: I
will explore and challenge the epistemological foundation of Western intervention in
Afghanistan, thereby arriving at solid footing from which to proceed with a cogent series of
policy suggestions with the goal of creating lasting peace within the state. I will ultimately
conclude that a heavily reduced presence of U.S. and NATO forces, working in an advisory
capacity, will be necessary to guide the Afghan government into creating an effective security
apparatus, thus allowing for a double paradigm shift to occur: not only will the U.S. and NATO
begin redirecting military funding away from dangerous offensive operations and toward
building an improved economy and more effective policing institutions, but the Afghan
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government itself will, in turn, be thus capable of refocusing its efforts on autonomously
instilling the rule of law.
The discussion will begin with an analysis of the theoretical assertions made both in
Anne Orford’s piece, “What can we do to stop people harming others?” and Robert D. Hanser’s
article entitled “Peacemaking Criminology.” I will then offer a critique of the theories as I
attempt to apply them to the case of Afghanistan, arguing in favor of a relatively small U.S. and
NATO military presence. Following this section, I will question through use of comparative
analysis the very principle that democracy is preferable to the authoritarianism that arose in the
state after the Soviet occupation – and ultimately question that democracy and Islam are
compatible – by pointing to competing viewpoints on the subject. By using process tracing, I
will attempt to understand if there is a correlation between the form of government being
implemented in the state and the current lack of peace and unity. A discussion of warlordism in
Afghanistan will then be appropriate to illustrate the difficulties in setting up a Western-style
democracy with a secure legal structure, as well as the reasons that required an organization as
severe as the Taliban to obtain power in order for even a modicum of unity to exist within the
struggling state. Finally, I will end by making a series of recommendations which address the
ineffective and disastrous use of Western military forces in the region and which will take into
account the need for ethnic unity made possible by an effective central security apparatus.
Contribution to the Literature:
Anne Orford’s argument in “What can we do to stop people harming others?” is highly
critical of the use of military force in any humanitarian effort. As a result, she refutes in her
work four major legal principles for justification of military intervention in such “emergency”
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situations as was the case in Kosovo in the late 1990s. The first principle, the metaphysical
account of law, extracts justification from “a universal law [of values] which transcends the rules
of any existing legal system.”1 NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, which was justified by this
account of law, is described as “illegal but legitimate.”2 This idea naturally brings with it a few
problems in Orford’s opinion: first, it does not follow that military action is the best way to
ensure the safety of the people; and second, because there is little legal framework for such
action, it is difficult to hold intervening nations accountable. The realist account of law is
described as merely a justification for powerful states to pursue self-interested goals via
humanitarian interdiction.3 The decisionist justification for military interdiction, according to
Orford, requires a “guarantor of the values of the legal order” in the absence of a functioning and
unified government, although the common trend is for such “guarantors” to instate authoritarian
governments to spur economic progress.4 Finally, using the democratic account of law as a
justification for intervention is problematic in that such decisions are made by entities such as the
United Nations Security Council and are, by default, simply reflections of the interests of the
most powerful nations. Orford’s response to the aforementioned methods of justification is to
assert that the formation of the international legal structure governing humanitarian issues should
involve “equal participation” by the populations the laws are meant to protect. In this manner,
the decision to intervene militarily will be “contestable.”5

1

Anne Orford, “What can we do to stop people harming others,” in Jenny Edkins, ed., Global Politics: A New
Introduction (London: Routledge, 2009) 427-453. Pg. 440.
2
Ibid 439.
3
Ibid 446.
4
Ibid 448. Orford points to authoritarian state theory, which asserts that intervention is frequently accompanied by
the formation of governments with powerful executive branches. These powerful executives, in turn, would
theoretically spur “social and economic integration.” In reality, however, authoritarian regimes often lead to
additional human rights violations.
5
Ibid 450.
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In R.D. Hanser’s “Peacekeeping Criminology,” the author explores the concepts of
restorative justice and peacemaking criminology as nonviolent means to ending conflict.
Restorative justice, Hanser explains, is a reactive process meant to hold the aggressors
accountable for their actions, as well as to emphasize the rights of victims. In contrast,
peacekeeping criminology is meant as a proactive tool meant to “eliminate the suffering that can
generate criminal behavior.”6 Hanser contends that these two methods should be used
concurrently so as to increase the odds of creating a lasting peace. He describes briefly the
process that restorative justice entails and then continues to outline Fuller’s peacemaking
pyramid paradigm. Fuller’s vision of peacemaking can be broken into six steps: nonviolence,
social justice, inclusion, correct means, ascertainable criteria, and the categorical imperative.
The steps, as explained by Hanser, are fairly straightforward. To begin with, it is necessary that
all parties agree to end fighting, or else no further negotiations would be possible. Second, social
justice requires that all parts of a society be treated equally, meaning issues of racism, sexism,
etc. must be addressed. On a similar note, the third step, inclusion, assumes that all parties will
participate in negotiations. During negotiations, the fourth phase of correct means will be
necessary to ensure that the dialogue goes smoothly and without “trickery,” and once said
negotiations have been carried out, it is necessary to inform all citizens of the progress made in
the peace talks; this, Fuller calls ascertainable criteria, the fifth step. Finally, Fuller employs the
Kantian principle known as the categorical imperative, which claims essentially that individuals
follow the ‘golden rule’ – that is, only carry out an action if at the same time one could wish that
it be universal law.7 Interestingly, Hanser points out the weakness in this peacemaking paradigm

6

Robert Hanser, “Peacemaking Criminology: A Special Issue – Part I,” Contemporary Justice Review 12:2 (June
2009) 191-205. Pg. 192.
7
Ibid 195.
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in the case of Rwanda. In essence, many Rwandans feared testifying against their aggressors
because of an imminent danger, despite the long-term benefits.8
The case is much the same in Afghanistan, where the first step – nonviolence – is
severely lacking. For Afghans, daily survival from a plethora of immediate dangers takes
precedence over political participation in a global human rights forum. Regarding such an
instance, Hanser explains: “If it is clear that a given group has no intention of refraining from
violence, then peacemaking is simply not an option. Rather, in such a case, self-defense
becomes the only priority.”9 Orford’s hopeful inclusion of political participation in the legal
structure of humanitarian intervention is, for the same reason, unrealistic in the special case of
Afghanistan. The state’s population, far from being able to band together and put an end to
violence, is instead defined by a socio-political schism. Myriad warlords of differing strengths
rule over civilians, and the many factions that exercise de facto10 autonomy are locked into a war
for power and extremely scarce resources. The many tribes are, in other words, engaged in “selfdefense”; the lack of “intention” to end violence stems not from an inherent evil, but from a very
real fear of being overcome by the competition. As a result, it is clear that Afghanistan is not
currently in a position to host productive peacekeeping talks of the type described by Hanser, due
primarily to the anarchy in the state propelled by an extreme lack of resources and infrastructure.
Moreover, if we heed to the non-interdiction argument posed by Orford, then it would seem that
nothing is to be done about the violence and quality of life issues in Afghanistan.
Whereas Orford and Hanser’s arguments have merit, they are less useful when viewed in
the context of the most extreme cases, in particular that of Afghanistan. I will therefore argue in
8

Ibid 201.
Ibid 195.
10
That is, the warlords are not legally autonomous according to international standards, but they nevertheless rule
over a given land virtually unchallenged.
9
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the final section of this paper, as a matter of deductive logic, for a small, stabilizing military
force meant to function in an advisory capacity to both the Afghan military and the state’s police
forces. Yet it is first necessary to question the principles behind the human rights effort in
Afghanistan. To begin, I will discuss whether democracy truly is the most effective system of
government to implement in Afghanistan, and whether the issues that currently exist with the
democratization efforts are too vast to overcome.
Democracy in Afghanistan:
As the democratization efforts in Afghanistan have so far been ineffective, the only
logical course of action would be to ask first, whether attaining an Afghan democracy is
plausible; and second, if so, then what needs to change for stability to be achieved? In
Christopher Freeman’s piece “Forging Islamist States through Secular Models – The Case of
Afghanistan,” he makes the argument that Islamism11 is perhaps the only viable method of
creating stability in the region. His claim is that, despite the fear and anger that is ultimately
elicited from the West at the thought of Islamic fundamentalism, it nevertheless “can be seen as a
necessary step in forging a lasting foundation for the state, and not dissimilar to the European
developmental process.”12 With a strict interpretation of Islam intertwined with the governing
structure, the legitimacy of jihad would effectively be stripped from rival Afghan tribes who
disagree with governmental policies. Thus, as a matter of practicality, Islamism is the most
effective method of attaining peace. In other words, a so-called “instant democracy,” Freeman
11

Ever since the Iranian revolution of 1979, the term Islamism – political Islam – has had a negative connotation for
many Westerners. Currently, the term is frequently (and mistakenly) associated with the September 11, 2001 attacks
and is viewed as being a catalyst for terrorist activity. There is, however, no inherent link between Islamism and
terrorism. Moreover, Islamism is not directly linked with any communist ideology, like some Westerners would
believe, as “even among the most radical Islamists, there is no communist interpretation of the Islamic economy.”
See Christopher Freeman, “Dissonant Discourse: Forging Islamist States Through Secular Models – The Case of
Afghanistan,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 15:3 (2002) 533-547. Pg. 537.
12
Ibid 542.
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claims, is a mere fantasy of the liberal West. To illustrate this point, he offers the words of
former United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali: “the process of
democratization…in order to take root and flourish…must derive from society itself…it is
essential that each state itself decide the form, pace and character of its democratization
process.”13 As the type of democracy currently being instilled in Afghanistan comes with
“imported” Western values, Freeman asserts that Islamism, although it may begin as an
authoritarian form of government with fundamentalist values, will soften its grip over time and
lead the way to “modern liberal governance.”14
In this manner, Freeman makes several important observations regarding the statebuilding and peacemaking processes in Afghanistan. First, the values of Islam are only
superficially being incorporated into the state structure. Second, the independence of different
ethnic groups within the territory is highly underestimated. Third, even with an Islamist
government, is not unlikely that a form of democracy will develop in the distant future. I
contend, however, that given the inherent problem with a Taliban-like tyranny – namely, the
likelihood of widespread violations of human rights – such a system is by no means something to
endorse. In Afghanistan, ethnic groups are locked in a culturally-ingrained struggle for power
and resources, and so it is highly unlikely that any multi-tribal Islamist regime will take place;
ergo, another violent hegemony will inevitably ensue if one ethnic group rises up to create an
Islamist regime. Additionally, not only will Islamism itself fail to fix the endemic problem of
poverty in the region, but it will likely propel the ethnic animosity that has caused so much tribal
warfare. Freeman argues, perceptively enough, that the presence of external actors (e.g. the
United States and NATO) will be necessary for too long in order to ensure that a successful

13
14

Ibid 544.
Ibid.
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democracy takes root in Afghanistan. This, however, is only necessarily the case assuming that
the current economic turmoil in the area continues unabated.
The assertion that Islamism is somehow a better alternative to democracy because of its
ability to unify the region underestimates the many potential negative attributes of the system of
rule. Freeman’s point that an Islamist regime will rob dissenters of the legitimacy of their jihadic
activities is, at least on the surface, logically sound. Yet the rivalries between different
ethnicities in Afghanistan in many ways precede the Muslim conquest of the region. Moreover,
the past actions of the Taliban do not seem to indicate that all violence will cease should a nonTaliban group set up an Islamist governing structure in the state. Instead, it is very reasonable to
assume that an alternative Islamist regime will not only see additional retaliatory measures taken
by the Taliban, but will itself be forced to exercise similarly brutal tactics in order to maintain its
position of absolute authority. In this process of maintaining authority, civil and human rights
will not be a primary concern. Furthermore, if the Taliban once again gains control over
Afghanistan, there is no reason to believe that it will transform into a governing structure that is
concerned with human suffering. The conclusion, then, from these possible Islamist alternatives
is that the ultimate goal of preserving human and civil rights in Afghanistan will best be
accomplished without Islamist rule.
Barry and Green argue in their piece “What Democracy for Afghanistan?” that it is
possible for a “minimal level of democracy” to be achieved in Afghanistan without
compromising the belief in Muslim law.15 They are, in essence, asserting that to foster
democracy does not mean manipulating the existing cultural identity of Afghanistan, particularly
in terms of religion. The argument is made, in part, using comparisons with other states that
15

Charles L. Barry and Samuel R. Greene, “What Democracy for Afghanistan? An Analysis Utilizing Established
Norms and Five Non-Western Case Studies,” Center for Technology and National Security Policy September 2009.
Pg. viii.
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likewise suffered internal unrest, but that successfully made a transition to democracy. Data
from The Correlates of War Project and Freedom House suggest that the average time it takes to
transition from a period of conflict to a period where a minimally functional democracy is in
place – where there was no democracy beforehand – is somewhere between 7-10 years.16 That
is, Barry and Green conclude from the studies that “establishing a democracy takes a significant
amount of time after the end of internal armed conflict if a state is not already a democracy.”17
The important qualifier in the authors’ conclusion is the absence of internal armed conflict in this
democratization period. Currently in Afghanistan, the insurgency by groups including but not
limited to Al Qaeda and the Taliban means violence is a daily occurrence. Thus, it is safe to say
that the traditional model of democratization as exemplified by such countries as Mozambique
and Nicaragua is fundamentally different than what is occurring in Afghanistan.
The element in question is violence, which Barry and Green claim “inhibits the ability of
citizens to participate in a democracy; in effect, it turns participation into a lie.”18 The authors
continue to describe specifically the effect of violence on political participation:
In a society where violence is rampant, local political life and the daily reality of public
life is decided by local groups of armed men who are unaccountable to a constitution,
justice system, or parliament…Such “democracy in name” marginalizes citizen’s
participation despite a democratic structure, because force rather than government
decides public policy. Violence reduces trust in institutions, and increases in-group
solidarity and mistrust of others, leading to a xenophobia that makes building democratic
society in a multi-ethnic environment very difficult. Low levels of trust in other citizens

16

Ibid 10.
Ibid 10.
18
Ibid 11.
17
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and in the government tend to retard the development of a democracy with staying
power.19
This description underlines two particular issues that can be applied to the case of Afghanistan.
The first is the superficiality of the elections being carried out in the state. Although the
elections may ultimately be considered “free and fair” – a debatable point at best – the results of
those elections are followed by a so-called “public policy” that is far too often implemented by
violent, anti-state actors. The second issue is the tribal identification common in Afghanistan
which, in and of itself, is not detrimental to a democratic, plural society. However, the mistrust
of different groups that provokes the “in-group solidarity” is inherently detrimental to an
inclusive, functioning democracy. Without a level of trust in the security apparatus associated
with the centralized government, the various ethnic groups residing in Afghanistan will continue
to withhold complete participation in democracy.
Traditionally, the people of Afghanistan have participated in various forms of democracy,
although they may seem dissimilar to what is recognized as modern, liberal democratic
governance. According to Anna Larson in her work “Deconstructing ‘Democracy’ in
Afghanistan,” the system of government has existed in Afghanistan in its most basic form for
many centuries. That is, the presence of “assembly democracy” has been a part of the fabric of
Afghan culture since long before contemporary Western forces intervened in the state.20 Shuras,
jirgas, and ulema councils, the basic structures needed for assembly democracy, were not
uncommon in Afghanistan until recently. Moreover, the notion that democracy must necessarily
19

Ibid. The ultimate issue here is the lack of legitimacy of a government that cannot maintain, as Max Weber has
said, a monopoly on the use of force. Without the ability to control violence or to protect private property, citizens
are not compelled to give their allegiance to the state; and without this requisite allegiance, no democracy will ever
develop. Hence, it is “unsurprising,” as Barry and Green note, “that most successful democratizing states have
relatively low levels of insecurity.”
20
Anna Larson, “Deconstructing ‘Democracy’ in Afghanistan,” Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit,
Synthesis Paper Series, May 2011. Pg. 4.
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involve elections, describes Larson, is a relatively new development based on the Greek
tradition, and one that followed the governing councils of Syria-Mesopotamia.21 In her
discussion, she critically assesses what it means to govern democratically and cites the work of
political analyst Fareed Zakaria, who makes the assertion that democracy need not be of the
liberal, Western variety. In other words, for one to assume, for instance, that a democracy must
necessarily include a separation of church and state would be to include unnecessary restrictions.
At its most basic level, the only requisite characteristic of a democracy is the act of governing by
the people.22
Theoretically speaking, it has been sufficiently proven that the Islamic religion is not
fundamentally at odds with the idea of democracy. In the Quran, no specific system of
governance is dictated, only a series of guiding moral principles on which governance is to be
predicated.23 The current prevalence of authoritarian Islamic states, claims Omer Caha in his
piece “Islam and Democracy: A Theoretical Discussion of the Compatibility of Islam and
Democracy,” is due primarily to pre-Islamic cultural influence and not to religious necessity.24
Furthermore, he describes the original Muslim caliphate system in the following manner:
The caliphate in Islam, in representing the general will of the community of believers
(ummah), served to promote their interests rather than legitimize the power of the
governing elite. The caliphate performed tasks like supervising the social harmony and
security inside, and reinforce [sic] the solidarity of society against possible attacks from
outside. The caliphate, in the early years, coincided with the general will of society. The

21

Ibid.
Ibid. This precedence of assembly democracy in Afghanistan will become important in the context of the
discussion of deliberative democracy in the Future Directions and Policy Recommendations section of the paper.
23
Omer Caha, “Islam and Democracy: A Theoretical Discussion on the Compatibility of Islam and Democracy,”
Turkish Journal of International Relations 2:3/4 (Fall/Winter 2003) 106-134. Pg. 108.
24
Ibid 109.

22
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powers and authority wielded by the Caliph during the Four Caliphs’ period directly
emanated, rather like contemporary democracies, from the consent of the people.25
Pro-democratic sentiments do exist in Afghanistan, although tribal warfare and economic
insecurity often hinder such rhetoric. Organizations such as the Revolutionary Association of the
Women of Afghanistan (RAWA), for instance, explicitly advocate for “an independent, free,
democratic, and secular Afghanistan.”26
Anna Larson acknowledges in her discussion of Islam and democracy a point made by an
academic named Samuel Huntington. According to Huntington, the only time a true democracy
was maintained in a primarily Muslim country for a significant period of time was in Turkey,
during the governance of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Furthermore, Ataturk’s professed goal during
his time in government was to push for a secular state. In Afghanistan, it would seem that to
create a secular state would not be culturally viable. Nevertheless, Larson counters the previous
point with a more scripturally-based assertion given by Khaled Abou El Fadl. He discusses
Islamic theology and claims “that Shari’ah is a complete moral code that prescribes for every
eventuality,” but that ultimately “God’s sovereignty provides no escape from the burdens of
human agency.”27 As humans are given rational faculties, an Islamic theologian might claim,
they are responsible for conducting their affairs accordingly. Indeed, the contemporary Afghan
populace has proved willing to participate in various democratic processes, but only insofar as
day-to-day security is guaranteed. Currently, though, such security does not exist. At the root of
the problem, in addition to the lack of a formal economy, is the cultural emphasis on tribal
25

Ibid 112.
Although the organization does advocate democracy, the U.S. and NATO are viewed as malignant influences on
the region. Much of the anti-West sentiment stems from unnecessary military operations that result in civilian loss
of life, an issue which will be addressed in the Future Policy Recommendations section of this paper. See
Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghans, About RAWA, http://www.rawa.org/rawa.html (February 25,
2011).
27
Larson 7.
26
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identification, which leads to a major impediment to state-building and peacemaking:
warlordism.
Warlordism in Afghanistan:
The people of Afghanistan have for centuries identified first with their respective tribes,
and then with whichever entity controlled the territory that now makes up the modern state, if
any at all.28 This tendency was magnified, however, when outside forces began influencing the
region and manipulating ethnic power structures within Afghanistan proper. During the
rebellion against the Soviet Union in the 1980s, certain individuals willing to fight against the
occupation were empowered by the U.S. and other external powers; various individuals affiliated
with the Afghan mujahedeen were given arms and training by the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) as well as Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in order to fight the communist
occupiers. After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, the militants were able to begin
cultivating opium poppy, an illegal form of income that allowed them independence from any
formal governing power. Therefore, these former mujahedeen militants effectively supplanted
the original tribal elders and began implementing regional tyranny.29
The resulting political situation, known as warlordism,30 produces neither a stage for an
effective economic system to develop nor any sense of non-coerced unity within the state. That
the U.S.-backed the Afghan Northern Alliance following the September 11, 2001 attacks,

28

The ethnic breakdown of Afghanistan can be approximated as follows: 50% Pashtun, 26% Tajik, 8% Uzbek, 7%
Hazara, 6% Aimaq, 3% other ethnicities. See Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady, “The Decline of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan,”
Asian Survey, 35:7 (July 1995), 621-634. Pg. 621.
29
Kimberly Marten, "Warlordism in Comparative Perspective,” International Security 31: 3 (Winter 2006/07), 4173. Pgs. 54-55.
30
The term, as described by Kimberly Marten, has a fourfold definition: “First, trained, armed men take advantage
of the disintegration of central authority to seize control over relatively small slices of territory. Second, their actions
are based on self-interest, not ideology. Third, their authority is based on charisma and patronage ties to their
followers. Fourth, this personalistic rule leads to the fragmentation of political and economic arrangements across
the country, disrupting the free flow of trade and making commerce and investment unpredictable. Savvy actors
react by limiting their economic activity to local regions.” See Marten 48.
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therefore, is counterintuitive to the goal of creating a unified nation-state. The Northern
Alliance, while it may have assisted the U.S. in ousting the oppressive Taliban regime, is
essentially a collection of local warlords.31 A December 2009 news article posted by RAWA
outlines concerns in the Balkh region of Northern Afghanistan regarding the violence being
carried out by local warlords to maintain dominance. Commenting on the issue, shopkeeper Baz
Mohammad relayed the following information: “I have never seen the Taleban [sic] in this
district…But I do see former warlords walking around with their weapons.” He later added in
the interview, “[t]he police and security forces cannot even patrol in our district at night any
more.”32 Similar testimony has originated from Afghan provinces farther to the east.33
Warlords have also severely impeded attempts at democracy in Afghanistan. According
to Marten, the electorate in the state exercised relatively little free will during the September
2005 parliamentary elections. During the process, describes the author, “a combination of
intimidation and fraud meant that local strongmen simply used [the voters] to give a false
democratic patina to their de facto rule.”34 Additionally, about 80% of all elected officials in
Afghanistan were believed to have affiliations with warlords or similar groups as of the 2005
elections.35 There has been significant outcry against the influence of warlords, but since the
primary source of income is an illegal one – opium poppy – the illegitimate authority which they
exercise is backed up by the money needed by Afghans in order to maintain a living. The selfinterested motives behind the actions of many warlords, which afford regular citizens at best a
31

Powerful individuals like the Uzbek General Rashid Dostum still maintain warlord status in 2011, with tacit
consent from United States military strategists. Their de facto autonomy is encouraged further by a lack of response
to the illegitimate collection of taxes as well as the unofficial checkpoints maintained by such warlords along the
border of Central Asia. See Marten 54.
32
Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan, Warlords Re-emerging in North,
http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2009/12/17/warlords-re-emerging-in-north.html (March 20, 2011).
33
Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan, Rogue Militias Abuse Rural Afghans
http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2011/01/14/rogue-militias-abuse-rural-afghans.html (March 20, 2011).
34
Marten 56.
35
Ibid 56.
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degree of security, have caused many to seek economic opportunities in relative safe havens.
Instead of potentially being unfairly taxed or coerced at the hands of warlords, asserts Marten,
“[m]erchants flock to industrial parks that are sponsored by the Afghan government with US aid;
unlike other locations, they promise clean land titles and perimeter security.”36 Further, Marten
explains that it is currently impractical for merchants to rebel against the circumstances, as there
are no viable economic alternatives to the markets monopolized by the warlords.37
Aside from impeding the democratic process, warlords threaten statehood in general by
undermining any governing structure’s attempt to implement rule of law. By robbing the state of
its necessary “monopoly on violence…to maintain the internal legal order,” they delegitimize the
government and, at the same time, create what D.D. van Grieken describes as a “security gap.”38
Certain powerful warlords, including Abdul Rashid Dostum in the north and Ismail Khan in the
south, have been granted positions in government to allow them legitimate authority to exercise.
In this manner, they have collaborated with Hamid Karzai and the central Afghan government.
Yet as van Grieken asserts, such individuals in “[t]his specific group of Afghan warlords
[are]…playing a double role: while being assumingly loyal to Kabul, they abuse their formal
positions to expand their territories, assert their authority and to thrive personally.”39 In other
words, in carrying out their function as warlords, they do so at the direct expense of the central
government’s ability to control the state within a legal structure.
Future Directions and Policy Recommendations:
I contend that the United States, with the help of its NATO partners, is in a position to
assist the Afghan government in forming a working security apparatus in the state. Indeed, given
36

Ibid 57.
Ibid 69.
38
D.D. van Grieken, “Collaborating Warlords in Afghanistan’s Political Reconstruction Process” (Ph.D.
Dissertation, University of Ultrecht, 2005), 14, 16.
39
Ibid 76.
37
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the previous discussion, it is necessary for outside forces to bolster the Afghan-driven effort if a
lasting peace will ever be achieved. The current Afghan government, after all, is not yet in a
position to maintain peace, thereby spurring economic prosperity and improving the standard of
living in the state. This need for assistance, coupled with the ability of Western forces to assist
in developing a mechanism for maintaining peace on which ordinary Afghans can depend, seems
to allow no excuse for inaction. What does not need to happen, though, is for superfluous
intervention to occur; such superfluities, as have defined Operation Enduring Freedom for the
better part of a decade, have been most unproductive. Examples of gratuitous violence on the
part of Western soldiers have undermined the entire campaign in the country by depriving the
Afghans of even a basic level of trust in the individuals charged with their safeguarding. The
role of U.S. and NATO forces in assembling a system capable of instilling law and order,
therefore, must remain passive by default, and such forces must not be involved in armed
conflict of any kind, except in extreme circumstances and instances of self-defense.
In order to create the conditions necessary for such a proper security apparatus to exist,
the Afghan population must be able to depend on an economy that is not rooted in the illicit
opium trade. In order to revive the Afghan economy, all foreign aid or funding from external
actors that is currently being funneled to expensive military air strikes or other offensive
maneuvers against members of the Taliban or Al Qaeda must immediately be redirected to
research and development projects. This will have a twofold effect: (1) On the one hand, much
needed programs would be funded, including research projects to isolate viable economic
alternatives to the production of opium poppy, such as the extraction of natural resources and the
export of various other crops. Development projects would be carried out to improve the almost
nonexistent power grid in the state, as well as the severely crippled highway and road system;
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such projects, coupled with an emphasis on education and literacy, would set the stage for
greater communication between the now isolated Afghans. (2) On the other hand, if all offensive
military operations were to cease, the Afghan outrage against the many civilian deaths as a result
of collateral damage at the hands of the West would no longer be a cause for concern. Hence,
the U.S. and NATO would regain legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan population. Consider the
following account from a letter written by Professor Jennifer Leaning in Afghanistan just after
the Taliban was defeated in 2002:
What does not need to be done is instill a sense of hope, energy, and resilience [in the
Afghans]. These core human capacities can be found in abundance in Afghanistan still,
despite all these years. But the window of opportunity will not stay open for long. People
cling to the faith that those who drove out the Taliban will now stay and help them
rebuild their country. The memory is still fresh, however, of the last time the
international community came and then left far too quickly. This memory clouds all
current expressions of optimism. If history seems to be repeating itself, there is no telling
how much farther Afghanistan might yet fall.40
Leaning’s sentiment contains at once a glimmer of hope and an ominous warning. It is unclear at
present whether the damage currently done by the most recent intervention in the country is
simply too much to bear for the Afghans.
Relations between Western forces and the Afghan people were severely strained on
March 11, 2012, when 16 Afghan civilians – nine children, four men, and three women – were
allegedly murdered by U.S. Army Staff Sergeant Robert Bales in the Panjwai district of
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Kandahar, Afghanistan.41 After the incident, much to the dismay of the Afghan people, the
soldier was taken by American forces back to the U.S. to be held in a Kansas military prison.
From the perspective of the people of Afghanistan, the situation seems bleak: not only has a
foreign military agent killed, seemingly in cold blood, at least 16 noncombatants without
provocation, but there will be no Afghan control over the process of justice. Although U.S.
officials have chosen to compensate42 the families of the deceased, giving away a total of
860,000 USC for the deaths of the civilians, the animosity towards U.S. forces is becoming all
too palpable. The American prosecution in the case will find it difficult to convict Bales for a
few reasons. Firstly, the kind of forensic evidence American investigators are accustomed to
providing to the prosecution does not exist. According to Islamic tradition, the bodies were
buried almost immediately after death, and so no autopsies were performed to confirm the causes
of death. Moreover, the prosecution will only be able to prove, at best, that the bullet casings left
at the crime scenes match Bales’ weapon. Secondly, Bales’ mental condition will certainly be
called into question considering the seemingly unprovoked and brutal nature of the killings.
Nevertheless, the fault is with the U.S. for putting the staff sergeant in a position to be able to kill
nine Afghan children and others. Given the initial sentiments of Jennifer Leaning, the stakes are
being raised each day, and with each case that diminishes the trust any Afghans have in Western
forces, the less likely it will be for U.S. and NATO forces to provide a security apparatus to
promote an Afghan democracy.
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Another unfortunate example of U.S. forces significantly disrupting relations with the
Afghan people occurred in February of 2012. The inadvertent burning of four Korans by
members of the U.S. military at Bagram Air Force base has created a backlash that may seem, at
first glance, disproportionate to the initial offense; yet, the issue is a deeply religious and cultural
one.43 For the Afghan people, to deface a Koran in any way is an extreme taboo, and for an
outside force to commit the offense in their own country is, for many, something that is
unforgivable. Even members of the Afghan Parliament are calling for protests against Western
‘occupiers,’ for as parliament member Abdul Sattar Khawasi of the Parwan Province has stated
explicitly, “Americans are invaders, and jihad against Americans is an obligation.”44 Violent
protests broke out all over Afghanistan in response to the incident, severely hindering diplomatic
processes between Western and Afghan officials. One protester articulated his disgust with the
Americans by addressing, in conjunction to the Koran burnings, multiple incidents involving the
defacement of dead bodies by U.S. soldiers and misguided airstrikes killing civilians:
This is not just about dishonoring the Koran, it is about disrespecting our dead and killing
our children. They always admit their mistakes. They burn our Koran and then they
apologize. You can’t just disrespect our holy book and kill our innocent children and
make a small apology.45
The faith the population once had in the Western liberators seems to be faltering more
each day, due in part to the flawed planning and strategies of military commanders in the region.
In short, “hunting down” perceived threats such as the Taliban and Al Qaeda is utterly short-
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sighted. If Afghans are to trust the U.S. and NATO military forces as allies, then collateral
damage must cease. Moreover, any foreign troops on Afghan soil must take active measures to
avoid any and all defection based on ideology by Afghan forces to the Taliban. That is, soldiers
must conduct themselves in a manner compatible with Muslim values. Even as early as 2008,
several newly-initiated Taliban forces were interviewed in article by Al Jazeera entitled
“Defections hit Afghan forces,” and claimed that the source of their defection was the antiMuslim actions carried out by what they view as the occupying forces. According to Sulieman
Ameri, for instance, he asserts, “I have seen prostitution, I have seen drinking. We are Muslim
and therefore jihad is our obligation.”46 Although NATO military commanders such as
Brigadier-General Richard Blanchette have asserted that Afghan police and security recruitment
has risen, the threat of defection remains, and the primary causes are avoidable ones.
Should such a paradigm shift occur in the security strategies of Afghanistan, then the
door would be opened to cooperation between U.S. and NATO military experts and burgeoning
national defense and police forces in the state – all with the (hopeful) support of the populace.
The number of U.S. and NATO military personnel in the area should immediately drop to fewer
than 10,000. Western involvement would therefore be seen less as an occupation, and more as a
collaboration between entities with the common goal of freedom and democracy. The role of the
United States Special Operations Command will be paramount to both training police forces on
effective policing strategies and in facilitating the creation of a unified, multiethnic national
defense system. It will be vital, in this case, not to appease and elicit the help of individual
warlords, as this would merely perpetuate the initial problem. Rather, teams of special warfare
operators, trained in Foreign Internal Defense (FID) tactics, should continue to utilize their
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linguistic and cultural training to incorporate elements of all ethnicities into the centralized
Afghan defense forces. The U.S. and equivalent NATO forces will be proactive only insofar as
they instruct Afghan organizations on such strategies, and will engage hostile (anti-government)
forces retroactively, but only when action is explicitly requested by the Afghan government.
An important caveat regarding any FID program is that three specific conditions should
be met in order for the U.S. government to carry out supporting operations. According to the
Foreign Internal Defense manual created by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, the following should
be true in order for FID to be implemented: “(a) The existing or threatened internal disorder
threatens U.S. national strategic goals; (b) The threatened nation is capable of effectively using
U.S. assistance; (c) The threatened nation requests U.S. assistance.”47 In the case of
Afghanistan, any one of the three conditions can be reasonably challenged. However, given the
context of this paper, it would seem that condition (c) particularly is becoming less true, as not
only are parliamentary officials openly declaring jihad on U.S. forces as a reaction to
aforementioned events, but Afghan President Hamid Karzai himself is growing impatient with
Western forces.48 It can even be argued that condition (c) ceased to exist in 2002 when
American military units were first sent to the region. In any case, the primary issue at hand is the
relationship between the Afghan population and government/security forces and U.S. military
and diplomatic advisors.
Specialized training, as per the FID manual, should be required of any and all U.S.
personnel being deployed to Afghanistan. In other words, conventional forces that lack such
training need not be involved in any type of occupation; if this should become the case, then
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instances of cultural insensitivity will be curtailed, and the number of scandals worthy of
Afghani protest will greatly be diminished. The requisite training components are explicitly
delineated in the FID manual. A number of the specialized requirements in the manual,
including proper intelligence gathering and self-defense training, pertain only to the goal of U.S.
national security. The important requirements in the context of this paper, however, involve
being able to effectively interact with the local population. For example, developing a keen
understanding of the local culture and customs is paramount to properly relating to the Afghan
police and military personnel being trained, as well as to civilians. Special warfare operators
must be aware of the various religious practices – in the case of Afghanistan, mostly Muslim – in
order to avoid committing offenses and therefore perpetuating a gap in trust. Language skills are
equally necessary for FID operators not only to offer a sign of respect, but to serve as a practical
means of communicating with trainees. Furthermore, it is important that any American soldiers
being deployed to Afghanistan be trained on “Standards of Conduct” in order to project a
responsible, helpful, and trustworthy image for the benefit of the Afghans with whom they will
work. Finally, specific training should be given that affords personnel conducting FID
operations a set of skills that allow them to coordinate effectively with nongovernmental
organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and other government agencies. Thus, the FID
operations will be more likely to “win over the population,” and less likely to seem like
imperialistic military ventures.49
Counterinsurgency specialists must be included in the minimal U.S. and NATO force
deployed in Afghanistan in order to advise and counteract the violence currently being employed
by anti-state actors. To refer to the previous discussion on democracy in Afghanistan, it is
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unlikely that any true form of participatory democracy can develop while destabilizing violence
is happening concurrently. Therefore, an effective counterinsurgency strategy will serve to
promote internal stability, in conjunction with the FID operations. The most important facet to
any effective counterinsurgency strategy is securing and maintaining the trust and support of the
local population. As David Kilcullen, Adjunct Professor of Security Studies at the Johns
Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, asserts, it is important
to act with respect for local people, putting the well-being of noncombatant civilians
ahead of any other consideration, even – in fact, especially – ahead of killing the enemy.
Convincing threatened populations that we are the winning side, developing genuine
partnerships with them, demonstrating that we can protect them from the guerillas and
that their best interests are served by cooperating with us is the critical path in
counterinsurgency, because insurgents cannot operate without the support – active,
passive, or enforced – of the local population.50
Kilcullen’s viewpoint is consistent with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in that the interpersonal
relationships between Western soldiers and Afghan security agents and civilians must be
enhanced. If local support is obtained, then the violent insurgent groups, including Al Qaeda and
the Taliban, will be limited in terms of resources. For United States Special Forces to
methodically hunt down an invisible enemy is not only extremely difficult and a waste of
resources, but also a detriment to the requisite goal of preserving civilian life at all costs; that is,
the more Western military units look to engage hostiles, the more collateral deaths occur.
Instead of this result, Kilcullen suggests simply allowing the insurgency to suffocate, having
been robbed of the support of the population. When insurgents are forced to engage in order to
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promote their cause, they will be neutralized by the superior training given to the Afghan
security officials by Western advisors.51
The security apparatus that this will yield will constitute the first step in transitioning
from a state defined by warlord rule to one which affords the central government the sole
responsibility of implementing law and order. Although it will be necessary for the United
States and NATO to change its intervention strategy in the state, it will also be incumbent upon
the existing Afghan government to make as its priority the creation of a judiciary that has
jurisdiction throughout the entire territory. Laws prohibiting destabilizing forces such as
political corruption, for instance, remain heretofore largely unenforced or nonexistent. Warlords
such as Dostum and Khan may have been accused of abusing their positions of power, yet
Hamid Karzai’s presidency has rarely been considered purely virtuous. Therefore, the judiciary
must also provide a balance of power to counteract the strong executive. Outside actors cannot
create this change within the Afghan government; they can merely allow for a window of
opportunity during which Afghan autonomy can emerge.
Conclusion:
Given the lack of resources, infrastructure, and political unity in Afghanistan, an effective
and humane governing structure will not develop without the assistance of outside forces. This
reality, far from being a social commentary on the inadequacies of the Afghan people, stems
from a very specific historical context, particularly in regards to the proxy war fought in the
country between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. in the 1980s. The conditioned tendency for
warlordism in Afghanistan is a product not only of these more recent Cold War conflicts, but
also the region’s long history of invasion and occupation. Intense tribal identification, a primary
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condition of warlord rule, is a natural response to violence, and one that has become more
prevalent with the continued insurgency of the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and other anti-state groups.
The inability of President Karzai and his central Afghan government to effectively instill the rule
of law and hold such groups responsible for the violence they commit has perpetuated this cycle
of informal, brutal rule.
Furthermore, if a democracy is to develop in the state in lieu of authoritarianism in order
to prevent violations of human and civil rights, foreign assistance must be allocated to assuage
systemic problems such as the absence of both a central Afghani policing mechanism and a
formal economy. Violence committed as a result of ethnic rivalry within the state must be
discouraged by the central government; currently, this is not the case, as the severe government
corruption that exists exacerbates, and in many ways even facilitates, this rivalry. Should a
limited number of U.S. special warfare operators, as well as equivalent NATO personnel, advise
Afghan officials on the proper methods of creating agencies to instill the rule of law, then local
warlords would be held responsible for any detrimental effects they may have on citizens.
Moreover, the governing structure will be able to more effectively deal with destabilizing forces
including Al Qaeda operatives and irreconcilable, violent members of the Taliban. In any case, it
is certain that democracy will not develop unless it is willed by the people. Nevertheless, if the
basic needs of the population of Afghanistan are met, then a high-functioning democratic state
might yet be in reach.
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